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Deahl: Offensive Collateral Estoppel under the Full and Fair Opportunity

COMMENTS
OFFENSIVE COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL UNDER THE
FULL AND FAIR OPPORTUNITY TEST
Since the landmark decision of Bernhard v. Bank of
America,' there has been much controversy over whether,
and under what circumstances, the doctrine of collateral
estoppel should apply in the absence of "mutuality". The
question that has raised the most problems in the courts is
whether collateral estoppel should be used "offensively".
Until recently it had been assumed that there was a fundamental difference between defensive and offensive collateral
estoppel, and that offensive use could always be denied in
the absence of mutuality. However, this assumption was
refuted by Parklane Hosiery v. Shore,' in which the United
States Supreme Court sanctioned the offensive use of collateral estoppel. When ParkIane Hosiery is combined with
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois
Foundation,8 the result is that the United States Supreme
Court has now endorsed both defensive and offensive collateral estoppel, and has replaced the requirement of mutuality with the test of "whether the party against whom
an estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to
litigate"' in the prior action.
Because of the possible dangers connected with offensive collateral estoppel, the commentators have developed
several objective methods of analysis which would limit the
opportunities in which collateral estoppel could be applied
offensively.' The courts have by and large ignored these
methodologies, and instead have chosen to analyze each case
in which offensive collateral estoppel is averred by subjectively examining the circumstances of the prior case from
Copyright(D 1980 by the University of Wyoming

1. Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Assn., 19 Cal.2d
807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
U.S .......
, 99 S.Ct. 645 (1979).
2. Parklane Hosiery v. Shore, - .......
3. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation,
402 U.S. 313 (1971).
4. Id. at 329.
5. See Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard
Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REV. 281 (1957); Currie, Civil Procedure: The
Tempest Brews, 53 CAL. L. REv. 25 (1965) ; Semmel, Collateral Estoppel,
Mutuality and Joinder of Parties, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1457 (1968); Comment, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel, 63 N.W. U. L. REv. 209 (1968).
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which the estoppel is said to arise. As pointed out in BlonderTongue, "[N]o one set of facts, no one collection of words
or phrases, will provide an automatic formula for proper
rulings on estoppel pleas. In the end, decision will necessarily
rest on the trial courts' sense of justice and equity."6 Consequently, whenever collateral estoppel is asserted offensively, the court should follow the Supreme Court's directive,
by carefully scrutinizing the circumstances surrounding the
prior action, in order to correctly apply the full and fair
opportunity test. This comment discusses the development
of the full and fair opportunity test, surveys the cases in
which the test has been applied to an offensive assertion
of collateral estoppel, and enumerates the factors which
should be considered in the full and fair opportunity test.
WHAT IS COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL?

Res judicata is a concept that is often misunderstood
by courts and practitioners alike. Much of the misunderstanding has occurred because courts often use the term
"res judicata" to encompass both of two distinct effects of
a prior adjudication. It is important to distinguish between
the two concepts. The first doctrine is true res judicata or
claim preclusion. The second is collateral estoppel, or issue
preclusion. Judge Learned Hand made a classic statement
of the difference between the two doctrines in Irving National
Bank v. Law:'
A judgment may be a merger or bar, or it may be
an estoppel. For the first, the cause of action must
be the same; for the second they may be as different
as possible. On the other hand, the merger or bar
extends, not only to matters pleaded, but to all that
might have been, while the estoppel extends only
to facts decided and necessary to the decision.
Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment
on the merits is an absolute bar to further action by the
same parties or their privies on the same cause of action,
6. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation,
at 333-334.
7. Irving National Bank v. Law, 10 F.2d 721, 724 (2d Cir. 1926).
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regardless of what issues were actually litigated.8 Thus, if
there is a judgment on the merits for the defendant, the
entire cause of action is extinguished, or "bar" occurs.'
If there is a judgment for the plaintiff, a "merger" of the
entire cause of action in the judgment occurs.1" In either
case, none of the grounds for, or defenses to recovery in
relation to the "claim" can be relitigated between the same
parties or their privies.
On the other hand, collateral estoppel applies when a
different cause of action is involved in the subsequent litigation. Once an issue is actually litigated and necessarily
determined, that determination is conclusive in a subsequent
suit involving a party to the prior litigation.' In other
words, a party is precluded from contesting an issue if it
has already been litigated in a prior action, even though
the prior action involved a different cause of action. 2
The Wyoming Supreme Court has recognized that
there is a difference between res judicata and collateral
estoppel, although it has used the two terms interchangeably, and prefers to refer to both concepts by use of the
term "res judicata". Therefore, caution should be exercised in reading a case which discusses "res judicata" in
order to ascertain how the term is being used. For purposes
of this comment, res judicata is used in the limited sense
to mean only claim preclusion, and collateral estoppel is
used to specifically mean issue preclusion or estoppel by
judgment.
Mutuality of Estoppel
Traditionally, the availability of collateral estoppel has
been limited by the mutuality doctrine, which requires one
8. See 1B MoORE's FED. PRACTICE % 0.405(1),
Montana v. United States,

..

U.S ....

at 621-624 (2d ed. 1974);

99 S.Ct. 970, 973 (1979) ; Roush

v. Roush, 589 P.2d 841, 843 (Wyo. 1979).
9. Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 HARv. L. REv. 1, 2 (1942).
10. Id. at 2.

11. Id. at 3, Montana v. United States, supra note 8, at 974.
12. 1B MooRE's FED. PRACTICE I 0.441(2), at 3776-3780 (2d ed. 1974); Salt
Creek Freightways v. Wyoming Fair Emp. 598 P.2d 435 (Wyo. 1979).
13. See Salt Creek Freightways v. Wyoming Fair Emp., supra note 12, at
438; Roush v. Roush, supra note 8, at 843; Bard Ranch Co. v. Weber, 557

P.2d 722, 728 (Wyo. 1967); Willis v. Willis, 48 Wyo. 403, 49 P.2d 670
(1935), reh. denied, 49 Wyo. 296, 54 P.2d 814 (1936).
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to have been either a party or in privity with a party to
the suit in which judgment was rendered in order to invoke
the conclusive effect of a prior judgment.14 Mutuality prevents a litigant from asserting the plea of collateral estoppel
unless he would have been bound if the judgment had gone
the other way.
The mutuality requirement was assaulted and struck
down by Justice Traynor in the case of Bernhard v. Bank of
America.' Justice Traynor pointed out that no satisfactory
rationalization had ever been advanced for the requirement
of mutuality, and concluded that there was no compelling
reason to require the party invoking collateral estoppel to
have been a party, or in privity with a party to the earlier
litigation."
It is not clear whether mutuality of estoppel is a requirement in Wyoming. In several cases, the court has made
broad statements which appear to recognize the traditional
doctrine of mutuality.17 But, in all of the recent cases, the
validity of mutuality was not before the court for determination, and the statements approving mutuality were
dicta. This was pointed out in Rust v. First National Bank of
Pinedale,5 where the federal court rejected the mutuality
requirement. Judge Brimmer noted that the mutuality rule
has been eroded in recent years and that the modern trend
is to abandon the doctrine." In spite of the cases which
appear to recognize mutuality, Judge Brimmer concluded
that the Wyoming Supreme Court would no longer adhere
to the requirement of mutuality :"0
It is inconceivable that the Supreme Court of this
state could so unequivocally approve of the policies
which favor a rule for non-mutuality, and yet, at
the same time, adopt the opposite doctrine, partic0.412(1), at 1801 (2d ed. 1974).
14. 1B MOORE'S FED. PRACTICE
15. Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Assn. supra note 1.
16. Id.

at 895.

17. See Salt Creek Freightways v. Wyoming Fair Emp., supra note 12, at 443
(Dissenting Opinion),; Roush v. Roush, supra note 8, at 843; Bard Ranch
Co. v. Weber, supra note 13, at 727.
18. Rust v. First National Bank of Pinedale, 466 F. Supp. 135 (D. Wyo. 1979).
19. Id. at 138.
20. Id. at 139. Since it was a diversity case the federal court was obligated
to follow the law of Wyoming.
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ularly in light of the United States Supreme Court's
pronouncements in Blonder-Tongue, and Parklane
Hosiery, the near universal trend toward abrogation of the mutuality requirement, and the extremely sound reasoning advanced in support thereof.
It is clear that the Tenth Circuit no longer requires
mutuality of estoppel. As stated in Brown v. DeLayo,2 ' "The
application of collateral estoppel in federal courts is not
grounded upon the 'mechanical requirements of mutuality.'
(citation omitted.) The test is whether a litigant has had
a 'full and fair opportunity for judicial resolution' of the
issue."
Defensive v. Offensive Estoppel
At this point it is necessary to distinguish between the
defensive and offensive uses of collateral estoppel. Defensive
use is the assertion of the plea of collateral estoppel by a
defendant who was not a party to the prior litigation. As
an example, assume the following sequence of events:
1) A v. B. B wins.
2) A v. C. C asserts A is collaterally estopped by the
judgment in Action 1.
Offensive use is the assertion of the plea by a non-party
claimant. As an example, assume the following:
1) A v. B. A wins.
2) C v. B. C asserts B is collaterally estopped by the
judgment in Action 1.2
The Full and Fair Opportunity Test
The United States Supreme Court has spoken twice in
regard to the defensive and offensive uses of collateral
estoppel. In Blonder-Tongue Laboratories,Inc. v. University
21. Brown v. DeLayo, 498 F.2d 1173, 1175-1176 (10th Cir. 1974). See also
Peffer v. Bennett, 523 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir. 1975).
22. It is implicit in the terms offensive and defensive collateral estoppel
that the plea is being asserted by one who was not a party to the prior
action.
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5 the Supreme Court approved of the
of Illinois Foundation,"
defensive use of collateral estoppel, by holding that a
patentee whose patent has previously been declared invalid
by a federal court should not be allowed to relitigate the
patent's validity against another alleged infringer.24 BlonderTongue has been read narrowly as applying only to patent
litigation, and indeed Justice White stated that the mutuality doctrine was not "before us for wholesale approval
or reflection. ' 5 Yet the tenor of the opinion was critical of
the mutuality requirement, and the Court recognized that
the judge-made doctrine has been rejected by an increasing
number of courts as unsound.2" Much of the opinion was
devoted to policy considerations, as the Court analyzed the
abrogation of mutuality in terms of considerations relevant
to the patent system, the economic costs of patent litigation,
and the burden imposed on the federal courts by allowing
relitigation of patent validity. In the final analysis, the
Court believed that "the requirement of determining whether
the party against whom an estoppel is asserted had a full
and fair opportunity to litigate is a most significant safeguard." 7 This significant safeguard should also be sufficient in areas other than patent litigation.

The Supreme Court allowed the offensive use of collateral estoppel in ParklaneHosiery v. Shore,2" which involved
a stockholders' class action for an alleged volation of SEC
regulations. Before the suit came to trial the SEC sued the
defendant with essentially the same complaint for injunctive
relief. The district court entered a declaratory judgment
for the SEC.2" The plaintiff in the civil action then moved
for a partial summary judgment on the ground that the
defendant was collaterally estopped from relitigating the
issues decided against it in the SEC action. Thus, the Court
was faced with the question of whether a prior judgment
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois, supra note 3.
Id. at 349-350. The decision was unanimous.
Id. at 327.
Id. at 350.
Id. at 329.
Parklane Hosiery v. Shore, supra note 2.
See Securities and Exchange Commission v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 422 F.
Supp. 477 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), af/'d, 558 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir. 1977).
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could be used offensively as an estoppel3 ° Even though the
Court recognized that several reasons have been advanced
why the offensive use of collateral estoppel should be treated
differently, it allowed offensive use under the facts of the
case:
We have concluded that the preferable approach for dealing with these problems in the
federal courts is not to preclude the use of offensive
collateral estoppel, but to grant trial courts broad
discretion to determine when it should be applied.
... Since the petitioners received a "full and fair"
opportunity to litigate their claims in the SEC
action, the contemporary law of collateral estoppel
leads inescapably to the conclusion that the petitioners are collaterally estopped from relitigating
the question
The Court in Parklane Hosiery utilized the approach of
examining the circumstances surrounding the prior case in
reaching its conclusion that the defendant had been afforded
a full and fair opportunity to litigate.2
As a result of the developments in the law, mutuality
is no longer a viable criterion of whether collateral estoppel
should be applied. It is a court-produced limitation which
no longer serves a useful purpose. It has been suggested
that mutuality was originally developed merely to serve
as an arbitrary standard in order to prevent the application
of collateral estoppel in situations where it might work
unjust results." But now the concept is an anachronism.
Mutuality has been replaced with the test of whether "the
party against whom the estoppel is asserted had a full and
fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding
30. Parklane Hosiery v. Shore, supra note 2, at 649.
31. Id. at 651-652.
32. A second issue in Parklane Hosiery was whether the offensive use of
collateral estoppel would violate the defendant's Seventh Amendment
right to a jury trial since the SEC action was equitable and the subsequent private action was legal. The majority, in an eight to one decision, concluded that it would not violate the Seventh Amendment to
estop the defendant when he had not had an opportunity to have the
facts of his case determined by a jury. The cases of Rachal v. Hill. 435
F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. den. 403 U.S. 904 (1970), and McCook v.
Standard Oil Co. of California, 393 F.Supp. 256 (C.D.Cal. 1975), which
reached the opposite conclusion on this issue are no longer the law.
33. See Note, Civil Procedure-Abandonment of the Mutuality Requirement,
22 ARK. L. REV. 491, 495 (1968).
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and that application of the doctrine will not result in an
'4
injustice under the particular circumstances of the case.' 1
In the federal courts, at least, the general rule is now
in favor of issue preclusion without regard to whether mutuality is present." In cases where a non-party to the prior
action is not allowed to assert collateral estoppel, it is not
because mutuality is lacking, but because of special circumstances surrounding the prior action that would make it
unfair to estop his opponent.
It is now almost universally recognized that four requirements must be satisfied in order for collateral estoppel to
apply:" 1) the earlier action must have resulted in a final
judgment on the merits; 2) the party against whom the
plea is asserted must have been a party or in privity with
a party in the earlier action;" 7 3) the issue decided in the
prior adjudication must have been identical to the issue
presented in the action in question; and 4) the party against
whom the plea is asserted must have had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior adjudication.
THE DANGERS OF OFFENSIVE ESTOPPEL

The courts and commentators have distinguished between defensive and offensive collateral estoppel and are
hesitant to allow offensive use. In discussing the propriety
of allowing either defensive or offensive use, it is appropriate to focus on the policy reasons underlying collateral
estoppel. The doctrine of collateral estoppel has the following
goals: 1) to protect parties to a lawsuit from the expense and
vexation attending the litigation of a dispute more than
once; 2) to protect the public's interest in preserving judicial
resources by preventing the relitigation of issues once
decided; 3) to foster reliance on judicial action by minimiz34.
35.
36.
87.

Butler v. Stover Brothers Trucking Co., 546 F.2d 544, 551 (7th Cir. 1977).
See Montana v. United States, supra note 8, at 978.
Peffer v. Bennett, supra note 21, at 1325.
The requirements of due process prohibit estopping a party unless he
had a chance to be heard in a prior litigation. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S.
32, 40 (1940). For applications of this limitation in the context of collateral
estoppel, see Humphreys v. Tann, 487 F.2d 666, 671 (6th Cir. 1973), cert.
den. 416 U.S. 956 (1974), and Gerrard v. Larsen, 517 F.2d 1127, 1133 (8th
Cir. 1975).
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ing the possibility of inconsistent decisions; and 4) to preserve the policy in our system of law that no one should be
deprived of his right to be heard."
The policy of protecting parties from multiple litigation is inapplicable in both the defensive and offensive
situations. The party asserting the plea has not been involved in any previous litigation. The party against whom
the plea is asserted has no desire to be protected, conversely
he wants to relitigate the issue. 9 When asking who may
assert the plea of collateral estoppel the interests of preserving judicial resources and of minimizing the possibility
of inconsistent decisions are the ones being served, and the
question will be whether the interests of the state are strong
enough to allow preclusion by a non-party." When asking
against whom may the plea be asserted the interest being
served is the right of a party to be heard, and the question
will be whether the party had a full and fair opportunity
to contest the issue in the prior action.4 The questions of
whether inconsistent results will be prevented, and whether
a reduction in the amount of litigation will result from the
application of collateral estoppel should be easy to answer
in any given case. Therefore, the focus should be on the
question of whether the party against whom the estoppel
is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to be heard.
Most courts have few qualms about allowing defensive
collateral estoppel. A rule allowing the defensive use serves
the purpose of minimizing unnecessary litigation by giving
the plaintiff a strong incentive to join all possible defendants in the first suit, since if he wins, they would not be
bound if not parties, and if he loses, he would be bound to
them all.42 Defensive use thus effectuates the policy of
38. See Montana v. United States, supra note 8, at 974; Blonder-Tongue
Laboratories Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, supra note 3, at
328-329; Rust v. First National Bank of Pinedale, supra note 18, at 138139; State of Maryland v. Capital Airlines, 267 F.Supp. 298, 303-304
(D.Md. 1967); In re Estate of Stevenson, 445 P.2d 753, 756 (Wyo. 1968);
Rubeling v. Rubeling, 406 P.2d 283, 284 (Wyo. 1965).
39. As pointed out in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories Inc. v. University of
Illinois Foundation, supra note 3, at 328, there is arguably a misallocation of resources when a party who has already had one chance is allowed
to relitigate.
40. Comment, supra note 5, at 224.
41. Id. at 222-223.
42. Parklane Hosiery v. Shore, supra note 2, at 650-651.
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original consolidation of all parties. Furthermore, there is
nothing unfair about precluding a plaintiff from relitigating an issue when he chose the forum and the parties to
the action.4"
On the other hand, many courts are skeptical about
allowing offensive use. They see several dangers inherent
in the offensive use of collateral estoppel. First, there is
the possibility that litigation will actually be increased as a
result of offensive use." In cases involving multiple claimants it will be advantageous for a putative plaintiff to adopt
a wait-and-see attitude and stay out of the first action filed
because he would have nothing to lose and everything to
gain. If the plaintiff in the first action loses, a non-party
would not be bound by the judgment. But if the named
plaintiff won that "test case," all the claimants waiting in
the wings would step in and wave the judgment as collateral
estoppel in subsequent actions against the defendant. The
amount of litigation could increase because consolidation
would be discouraged."
Also, there is the possibility that the defendant may
not have had an adequate opportunity or ability to defend
in the former action. 6 The first suit might involve a small
claim, and the defendant would not be able to afford to
make an extensive defense. "7 The defendant also might forego
an appeal from an adverse judgment."s The defendant might
be lacking procedural advantages in the first action because
of the particular forum chosen by the plaintiff." An issue
43. The following cases allowed defensive estoppel: Lowell v. Twin Disc, Inc.,
527 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1975), Ritchie v. Landau, 475 F.2d 151 (2d Cir.
1973), (contract actions); Poster Exchange, Inc. v. National Screen
Service Corp., 517 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. den. 423 U.S. 1054 (1976),
(anti-trust); Brown v. DeLayo, supra note 21, P.I. Enterprises, Inc. v.
Cataldo, 457 F.2d 1012 (1st Cir. 1972), (civil rights); Federal Savings
& Loan Insurance Corp. v. Hogan, 476 F.2d 1182 (7th Cir. 1973), (mortgage
case) ; and Cardillo v. Zyla, 486 F.2d 473 (1st Cir. 1973), (prior action
was criminal).
44. See Parklane Hosiery v. Shore, supra note 2, at 651.
45. This danger was also recognized in Spettigue v. Mahoney, 8 Ariz. App.
281, 445 P.2d 557, 564 (1968), Nevarov v. Caldwell, 161 Cal. App. 2d 762,
327 P.2d 111 (1958), and Reardon v. Allen, 88 N.J. Super. 560, 213 A.2d
26 (1965).
46. See Parklane Hosiery v. Shore, supra note 2, at 651.
47. See Reardon v. Allen, supra note 45, at 31.
48. See Berner v. British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines, LTD, 346 F.2d 532
(2d Cir. 1965).
49. See Spettigue v. Mahoney, supra note 45, at 562.
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which was insignificant in the prior suit, and thus not
litigated vigorously, may become critical in a later suit. "
For these and other reasons, the defendant may not have
had a fair opportunity to defend the previous action.
A third danger is the multiple claimant anomally.5" In
multiple claimant cases, the defendant might win any number of judgments, yet any plaintiffs not parties would not
be bound. 2 But, if the defendant were to lose a suit, he would
then be precluded from contesting the issue against all remaining plaintiffs, if collateral estoppel were applied. The
judgment relied on for the estoppel might be inconsistent
with numerous previous judgments for the defendant. There
is also the possibility that the first judgment was an aberration, such as a compromise verdict, or that the plaintiffs
may have colluded to choose an oppressive forum. Yet if
collateral estoppel were applied, the defendant would not
be able to relitigate against any of the remaining claimants. 3
One question is how these dangers should be taken into
account in the application of the full and fair opportunity
test. There are at least two possible alternatives. Either
the dangers could become elements to be weighed in the test
itself, or the dangers, if present in a case, could lead to an
exclusion of the test and a reversion back to the mutuality requirement in that case. The proper approach would be to
include these possible dangers; along with the procedural
aspects of the prior action, the goals of collateral estoppel,
and policy considerations, as criteria to be considered in resolving the ultimate question-whether the party had a
full and fair opportunity in the prior action. The result would
be a balancing test, whereby a court could reconcile the interest of a litigant to be heard with the societal interest in
finality of litigation.
50. Report to the President & the Attorney General of the National Commission
for the Review of Antitrust Laws & Procedures, 80 F.R.D. 509, 593 (1979).
51. This danger was first exposed by Currie in 9 Stan. L. Rev., supra note 5,
at 281. See Currie's famous railroad hypothetical, which is set forth in
Parklane Hosiery v. Shore, supra note 2, at 651 n. 14.
52. Hansberry v. Lee, supra note 37, at 40.
53. See Nevarov v. Caldwell, supra note 45, at 115-116.
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The full and fair opportunity test has evolved in the
courts on a case-by-case basis. When collateral estoppel has
been availed of offensively, the courts have closely inspected
the circumstances surrounding the prior action in order to
determine whether the defendant was afforded a full and
fair opportunity to litigate the issue. Many factors have
influenced the courts' decisions, and these factors are brought
out in the survey of the cases. Professor Currie was originally unsure that courts would be willing to undertake this
individualized inquiry, but later retracted his reservations,
with apologies for his lack of faith in the judicial systems."
Under the case-by-case approach the defendant has the
burden of proving that he did not have a full and fair
chance in the first action, as an affirmative defense. 5
One argument against applying the case-by-case approach is that it might lead to increased litigation, because
there would be no certainty. But it has been suggested that
the type of litigation involved in determining whether a
party had a full and fair opportunity would be less time
consuming than a trial on the merits since it would be decided
on a motion for summary judgment." Moreover, certainty
should develop through the principles of stare decisis as
more cases are decided.
Contract and SEC Cases
It is proper to begin by discussing an area in which
offensive estoppel has usually been allowed. Contract cases
are such an area. The leading case is Zdanolk v. Glidden,5"
where the issue was the construction of a collective bargaining agreement. In the previous case, which was a test case
involving five employees, the contract had been construed
54.

Currie, 53 CAL. L. REV., supra note 5, at 28.

55. See Bloider-Tongue'Labiatoriies,-Inc . v-Uiversity of Illinois Foundation,
at 333, and Hart v. American Airlines, 61 Misc.2d 41, 304 N.Y.S.2d 810, 813
(1969).
56. Note, Collateral Estoppel: The Demise of Mutuality, 52 CORNELL L. Q.
724, 730 (1967).
57. Zdanok v. Glidden, 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1964). A holding in Zdanok that
had nothing to do with collateral estoppel was overruled in Local 1251
International U. of U.A.A. & A.I.W. v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 405 F.2d
29, 33 (2d Cir. 1968).
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against the defendant. The court held that the defendant
was estopped from contesting liability in a later action,
which involved 160 plaintiffs." Several factors led to the
court's offensive application of collateral estoppel.5" The
defendant had been able to choose the forum for the first
case. The defendant had not been unfairly surprised by
the second action so that he would have defended more diligently if the two actions had been combined from the outset,
since he was aware that the second action was lurking in the
wings. Perhaps most importantly, the issue was the construction of a written contract by a judge, which should not
vary from forum to forum, rather than a factual issue such
as negligence, which would be subject to varying interpretations by different juries.
In contract cases, the assumption is that there is only
one "correct" construction of a written contract. Thus,
collateral estoppel should be allowed offensively because the
threat of inconsistent results is less probable and litigation
can be effectively reduced by estopping the defendant.
SEC cases should also be appropriate for the offensive
use of collateral estoppel in many instances. In Fink v.
Coates,"0 offensive estoppel was denied. The case involved
a tort action based on an alleged violation of the SEC Act of
1934. The defendants had been held liable in a previous
suit. The plaintiffs argued that collateral estoppel should
be applied in their favor and cited Zdanok to support their
contention." The court distinguished Zdanok 2 In Zdanok,
the prior judgment had been fully appealed at the time
collateral estoppel was applied. Here, the prior action was
still on appeal. In Zdanok, the defendant chose the forum
in the prior action. Here, the defendant was unsuccessful
in an attempt to obtain a transfer to another forum. Zdanok
involved the interpretation of a written contract, which
should not differ from forum to forum. Fink was a tort
action and the resolution of the legal issue of subjective in58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

id. at 956.
Id.
Fink v. Coates, 323 F. Supp. 988 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
Id. at 989.
Id. at 989-990.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1980

13

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 15 [1980], Iss. 1, Art. 8

260

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XV

tent might vary between forums. But perhaps the real
reason for the decision in Fink was doubt as to what was
actually decided in the prior action because of a lack of findings of fact or conclusions of law."8
Parklane Hosiery adopted the Fink rule of granting
the trial courts broad discretion to determine when collateral
estoppel should be applied offensively." The Supreme Court
recognized that collateral estoppel could be unfair to a defendant if used offensively, but allowed it because none of
the dangers were present. 5 The plaintiff could not have
joined in the prior injunctive action initiated by the SEC.
Because of the serious allegations in the SEC's complaint,
and the fact that the defendant was already aware of the
plaintiff's action, the defendant had every incentive to litigate vigorously. For these reasons, the Court decided the
defendant had a full and fair opportunity to litigate its
claim in the prior action." Parklane Hosiery suggests that
offensive estoppel would be proper in cases where the government has intervened and won after a private suit has been
filed.
Cases Involving Policy Considerations
In several cases the courts have purported to base their
decision on whether or not to apply collateral estoppel on
policy reasons; and in some situations, particulary where
a plaintiff has been attempting to estop a government defendant on a matter of law, the courts have reverted back to
the mutuality requirement. A better approach would be
for the courts to incorporate the policy considerations into
the full and fair opportunity test, so that estoppel would
not be automatically precluded in every case.
7 the Second Circuit did not
In Divine v. Commissioner,"
apply collateral estoppel offensively in a tax case, and
stated that its decision must rest on policy considerations. 8
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 990. The court, which was wary of offensive collateral estoppel,
seized upon this lack of findings as a way to justify its desired result.
Parklane Hosiery v. Shore, supra note 2, at 651.
Id. at 652.
Id.
Divine v. Commissioner, 500 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1974).
Id. at 1048.
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The issue in the case was whether a corporation had any accumulated earnings and profits so that cash distributions
made to its shareholders were dividend income to the shareholders, rather than a return of capital. The shareholders
had treated the distributions as a nontaxable return of capital on their tax returns. The Commissioner of Internal
Revenue had treated the distributions as taxable dividends,
and had mailed deficiency notices to the shareholders.
Several shareholders filed suit challenging the alleged deficiencies. In an earlier action the Seventh Circuit had
held for the shareholder."' Despite this adverse decision,
the Commissioner wanted to contest precisely the same legal
issue in the second action, which arose out of the same transaction. The plaintiff argued the Commissioner should be
estopped from relitigating, and cited Blonder-Tongue and
Zdanok. ° The plaintiff did not contend that the Commissioner should be estopped from litigating the tax issue in all
cases. He only argued that the court should proceed to
apply the full and fair opportunity test. 1 The court distinguished these cases, and said the tests in them were intended to apply only to certain classes of issues which for
policy2 reasons it has been decided should be litigable only
7
once.
Zdanok was distinguished as involving an issue not
"subject to varying appraisals"73 of the facts by different
juries. Presumably, the construction of the contract would
be the same in any forum. The court said the tax issue involved was "subject to varying appraisals", since the tax
law is unusually complex, with a resulting judicial conflict over the interpretation of the law itself, rather than
how the "law" should be applied to specific facts.74
Blonder-Tongue was distinguished as being limited to
patent litigation. The court felt that the Supreme Court had
precluded relitigation of patent validity for policy reasons :71
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

See Luckman v. Commissioner, 418 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1969).
Divine v. Commissioner, supra note 67, at 1046.
Id. at 1047.
Id.
Id. at 1048.
Id.
Id.
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1) patent litigation consumed a disproportionate amount
of the federal courts' time; 2) it had proven to be extraordinarily expensive to the litigants; and 3) allowing relitigation
would produce anticompetitive results in the marketplace.
The court argued that these reasons were not necessarily
relevant in the realm of tax litigation.
The court further distinguished the tax laws." There
is an extraordinary desire for uniformity and certainty in
the administration of the tax laws, because the issues are
of importance to the public, not just the particular litigants.
Uncertainty in the tax laws can only be resolved by the
Supreme Court, which will not grant certiorari until two
or more circuits have adopted conflicting positions. The application of collateral estoppel would decrease the chances
of a conflict occuring as soon as possible with the result that
tax issues would remain unresolved for substantial periods.
In effect, the court was encouraging inconsistent results
as a means of achieving certainty in the long run. The
court's argument was premised on the proposition that the
practice of the Commissioner to assert that a Court of Appeals decision with which he disagrees has no binding effect
in other circuits is proper.77 What the court overlooked was
the fact that if collateral estoppel were applied the Commissioner could no longer take this position. If the Commissioner were estopped uniformity would result, and it follows
that there would be no uncertainty for the Supreme Court
to resolve.
The commentators have disagreed as to whether the
court in Divine was correct in requiring mutuality in federal
The better view is that the application of
tax litigation."
mutuality cannot be justified by policy considerations unique
to tax litigation." Policy considerations might explain why
offensive estoppel was not allowed in a case, but the result
should not turn on the fact that mutuality was lacking.
76. Id. at 1049-1050.
77. Id. at 1049.
78. See Comment, Divine v. Commissioner: Collateral Estoppel and the Mutuality Requirement in Federal Tax Litigation, 60 IowA L. REV. 1420
(1975), for the view that Divine was correct; and Note, Collateral Estoppsl: Loosening the Mutuality Rule in Tax Litigation, 73 MIcH. L. REv.
604 (1975), for the view that Divine was incorrect.
79. Note, 73 MIcH. L. REV., supra note 78, at 618.
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What really bothered the court in Divine was the fact
that the plaintiff was attempting to estop the Commissioner
on a matter of law. The court was concerned that the Commissioner might be estopped in another case involving the
same tax issue, but where the facts were quite dissimilar.'"
Indeed, the allowance of offensive estoppel on a matter of
law could have a very broad impact. The Commissioner is
the defendant in all deficiency suits, and therefore will have
been a party to the previous suit. If estoppel were allowed
the door would be open for innumerable taxpayers to preclude the Commissioner once a legal issue has been decided
against him. The positive results would be that all taxpayers
would be treated uniformly, and there would be a tremendous
reduction in litigation. On the other hand, the decision on
which the estoppel is based could be wrong, or it could be inconsistent with previous decisions in other circuits.
These competing interests can be resolved by the full and
fair opportunity test. Professor Scott has suggested that
collateral estoppel should not be applied to questions of law
unless the successive actions involve the same question of
law, and arise out of the same transaction or involve the same
subject matter.81 This approach would alleviate the problem
that troubled the court in Divine, and is preferable to the
strict requirement of mutuality that was imposed there. In
Divine, two shareholders in the same corporation were
treated differently with respect to the same transaction,
because of the imposition of the mutuality requirement.82
Since the Commissioner had already had an adequate opportunity to litigate the legal issue in respect to the transaction involved, he should have been estopped in Divine.
Under Professor Scott's limitation, the Commissioner would
have been estopped in Divine, but would not have been susceptible to estoppel on that legal issue in subsequent cases
involving a different transaction.83 The proper result could
80. Divine v. Commissioner, supra note 67, at 1050.
81. Scott, 56 HAav. L. REV., supra note 9, at 10.
82. As was pointed out in Note, 73 MICH. L. REV., supra note 78, at 614, that
situation is much worse than if taxpayers were treated differently in the
various circuits.
83. In the next factual situation posing the same legal issue, stare decisis
could be applied against the Commissioner.
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have been reached if the full and fair opportunity test had
been applied in light of the policy considerations, rather
than the policy considerations triggering an automatic application of the mutuality requirement. As stated in United
States v. Abatti,' there is "no good reason for a per se rule
of mutuality in tax cases."
The rationale of Divine was extended to a subpoena enforcement action in United States v. Anaconda Co..' The
Consumer Product Safety Commission brought an action
to enforce a subpoena against an aluminum siding manufacturer. In a previous case, the court had decided that the
Commission lacked jurisdiction over the same issue involved
in the present suit."0 The defendant argued that the Commission should be collaterally estopped from relitigating
the identical issue." The government argued for adoption
of a strict mutuality rule. The court compared this situation to Divine and said the issue going to the heart of the
Commission's jurisdiction was a question of public concern
and that inquiry by other circuits would be healthy and
should not be foreclosed. 8 The court held that it would" require strict mutuality in the somewhat unusual circumstances of this case."8 "
Anaconda is similar to Divine in that both cases involved a complex legal issue which would be present in recurring litigation. But in Anaconda the previous action
had involved a different transaction. In this context, under
the limitation suggested by Professor Scott, it would not
have been proper for the resolution of the legal issue to have
had a collateral estoppel effect, and the court reached the
84.

85.
86.

87.
88.
89.

United States v. Abatti, 463 F. Supp. 596, 603 (S.D.Calif. 1978). Here
the full and fair opportunity test was applied by an analysis of the facts
of the case, and the court estopped the Commissioner. The full and fair
opportunity test was utilized in another tax case, Baily v. United States,
350 F. Supp. 1205 (E.D.Pa. 1972), Aff'd on reh., 355 F. Supp. 325, 328
(E.D.Pa. 1973).
United States v. Anaconda Co., 445 F. Supp. 486 (D.D.C. 1977).
See Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. United States Consumer Product Safety Commission, 428 F. Supp. 177 (D.Del. 1977), where the issue
was whether aluminum home wiring systems were "consumer products"
within the meaning of the Consumer Product Safety Act, so that the
Commission had jurisdiction over them.
United States v. Anaconda Co., supra note 85, at 494.
Id. at 496.
Id.
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correct result. Furthermore, the issue was one of obvious
public concern because of the possible safety hazards involved. It was proper for the court to hold that a single
decision by a district court should not be determinative of
this important issue, because of the possibility that the issue
might have been decided the wrong way.
Mass Accident Cases
Cases involving a mass accident present the typical
situation in which the multiple claimant problem can arise.
It could be argued that under the reasoning of Divine, strict
mutuality should be required in these cases, because of the
possibility of inconsistent results, and because the issues involved have an impact on many others, i.e. the numerous
claimants who are waiting to file suit. The fallacy of the
analysis in Divine was that it precluded an application
of the policy considerations to the facts of the case at hand.
The public policy of preventing needless litigation should be
strong enough to allow the utilization of the full and fair
opportunity test in the mass tort cases. The test itself
would ensure that collateral estoppel is not allowed in cases
where the dangers are serious.
Some courts have allowed, and others have refused to
allow offensive collateral estoppel in this area. Offensive
use was, allowed in United States v. United Airlines, and
Hart v. American Airlines. 1 Both cases involved wrongful
death actions after an airplane crash. In United Airlines,
the defendant was found to be liable in the first action,
which involved twenty-four plaintiffs. In applying collateral estoppel, the court said the issue of liability was tried
to the hilt in the first trial, the defendant had no new or
different evidence, and it would be a travesty of justice to
require the remaining plaintiffs to relitigate the issue of
liability after it had been so thoroughly litigated.2
90. United States v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709 (D.Nev. 1962),
cert. dismissed 379 U.S. 951 (1964). The decision was approved in United
Airlines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964).
91. Hart v. American Airlines, supra note 55. Also see State of Maryland v.
Capital Airlines, supra note 38, which is a well-written opinion.
92. United States v. United Airlines Inc., supra note 90, at 728.
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In Hart, the prior action, in which the defendant was
held to be liable, involved only one defendant, but the court
said this did not matter. 3 The court dismissed the defendant's argument that the jury verdict in the prior action
might have been an aberration as inconsistent with notions
of full faith and credit and the judicial system's faith in
jury trials. 4 It should be noted that the court actually precluded the possibility of inconsistent results by allowing
collateral estoppel, and thus fulfilled the policy of assuring
certainty and faith in the judicial system.
On the other hand, in Berner v. Commonwealth Pacific
Airlines, LTD, 5 collateral estoppel was not applied offensively in litigation arising out of an airplane crash. The first
action had resulted in two trials. The defendant had won
a jury verdict in the first trial, but the judge granted the
plaintiff's new trial motion. The plaintiff recovered a small
judgment in the second trial." The court decided it would
be unfair to apply collateral estoppel because the defendant
had not appealed the second trial, and whatever errors had
been made remained." The court's rationale was that the
defendant did not appeal for fear that a third trial would
result in higher damages being awarded, and that since
Zdanok had not been decided at the conclusion of the second
trial he did not know he could be estopped?5
In most of the mass accident cases in which offensive
estoppel has been raised, the plaintiff has won the first
action filed, and inconsistent results are possible only if collateral estoppel is not allowed. Thus, the "multiple claimant
anomaly" posed by Professor Currie may be more hypothetical than actual.
Perhaps the possibility of inconsistent results should be
immaterial in determining whether the defendant had a full
and fair opportunity in a prior lawsuit. This notion is sug93. Hart v. American Airlines, supra note 55, at 815.
94. Id. at 815.
95. Berner v. British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines, LTD, s-upra note 48, at
538-541.
96. The plaintiff recovered a $35,000 judgment.
97. Berner v. British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines, LTD, supra note 95, at
541.
98. Id. at 540. The plaintiff in the second action sought $7,000,000 in damages.
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gested by Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. Kawneer Co., Inc.,9
which involved a defensive use of collateral estoppel in connection with patent litigation. In the first suit, the patent
at issue was held to be valid and infringed. In a later suit,
the patent was held to be invalid. In the present action, the
plaintiff was collaterally estopped from contesting the issue
because of the finding in the second action."' The plaintiff
argued that since there was a finding of validity prior to
the finding of invalidity it would be inequitable to estop the
On the basis of Blonder-Tongue, the court
third action.'
held that the test is not whether the prior finding was "correct", but whether the plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate, and he did in the second action.0 2 The
court thus had no discretion to deny estoppel. The case illustrates that the focus should be directed on the previous
decision, regardless of the results in any earlier cases.
In any event, there is not a causal relationship between
collateral estoppel and inconsistent results. Assume a mass
accident with ten claimants who have filed ten different
lawsuits against one defendant. If a plaintiff wins the first
suit, inconsistent results can occur only if collateral estoppel
is not applied. If the defendant wins several actions and
then loses one, inconsistent results have already occurred,
and collateral estoppel did not cause the problem. The ultimate solution would be to somehow require all ten plaintiffs
to join in one suit. Until that can be achieved, collateral
estoppel can be applied to save judicial time and resources.
It follows that the possibility of inconsistent results should
not be an element of the full and fair opportunity test.
It could still be argued that the problem of putative
claimants staying out of the first action filed will remain
But this problem
to increase the amount of litigation.'
is not really caused by collateral estoppel. There are many
reasons why a claimant could want to stay on the sidelines,
other than the possibility of asserting another plaintiff's
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. Kawneer Co., Inc., 482 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1973).
Id. at 549.
Id. at 547.
Id. at 546.
See Parklane Hosiery v. Shore, supra note 2, at 651.
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judgment against the defendant. Thus, even if collateral
estoppel were not allowed offensively it would not cause all
claimants to join in the first suit filed.
Automobile Accident Cases
One of the most common situations in which collateral
estoppel is available is the automobile accident cases. Such
a case typically involves three parties: two plaintiffs suing
for either personal injury or property damage, and one defendant. The possibility of inconsistent results cannot be
a reason for denying collateral estoppel in these cases, assuming the defendant lost the first action."' Inconsistent
results can occur only if collateral estoppel is not applied.
The courts that have not allowed offensive estoppel.. 5
have been concerned with two dangers. First, a possible
plaintiff may wait in the wings in the hopes that the first
action will establish the defendant's liability. As a result,
This danger is not serious
litigation may be increased.'
since usually only two plaintiffs are involved. Unless the
defendant can compel the absent claimant to join in the first
action, two actions would be necessary regardless of whether
collateral estoppel were allowed. Furthermore, if the plaintiff won the first action and collateral estoppel were allowed,
litigation would be decreased because the only issue in the
second trial would be damages.
Second, courts worry about the unfair burden that can
be placed on the defendant. In Mackris v. Murray,10 7 the
court discussed the practice of plaintiff's lawyers to advance
a "test case" to quickly establish liability. The court used
a hypothetical in which one plaintiff filed a $50 property
damage suit to establish the liability of the defendant, then
the second plaintiff filed a large personal injury suit. It
would not be economically feasible for the defendant to make
If the defendant won the first action, collateral estoppel would not be an
issue.
105. See Spettigue v. Mahoney, supra note 45, Nevarov v. Caldwell, supra
note 45, Reardon v. Allen, supra note 45, Pomeroy v. Waitkus, 183 Col.
344, 517 P.2d 396 (1974), and Mackris v. Murray, 397 F.2d 74 (6th Cir.
1968).
106. See Reardon v. Allen, supra note 45, at 32.
107. Mackris v. Murray, supra note 105, at 81.
104.
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an extensive defense to the small claim. The defendant
could not afford to appeal from an adverse judgment for
an insignificant amount in order to keep the issue of his
negligence open. This danger is real and a court should
consider the size of the claim in the prior action in applying
the full and fair opportunity test.
On the other hand, many courts have allowed estoppel
to be asserted offensively in this area.'0 5 These cases indicate that courts survey the particular facts of each individual case and are willing to allow offensive estoppel when
the dangers are not present.
On the basis of Divine, it could be argued that if the
issue is subject to varying appraisals, as is the issue of
negligence, the full and fair opportunity test should not be
applied. This argument should not be valid after Interboro
Mutual Indemnity Insurance Co. v. United States,' which
involved the issue of negligence. The case involved an action
against the government for property damage resulting from
a car collision, under the Federal Tort Claims Act. In a
previous action the government had been held liable for personal injuries stemming from the accident. The court distinguished Divine as involving "complicating factors", applied the full and fair opportunity test, and estopped the
government."' The court limited Divine to the proposition
that collateral estoppel will not be appropriate when overriding policy questions are present."' The fact that an issue
is one which is subject to various interpretations in different
tribunals is an element of the test itself.
The correct application of the full and fair opportunity
test is illustratetd by Butler v. Stover Brothers Trucking
108. See Skrzat v. Ford Motor Co., 389 F. Supp. 753 (D.R.I. 1975), Interboro
Mut. Indem. Ins. Co. v. United States, 431 F. Supp. 1243 (E.D.N.Y. 1977),
Gorski v. Commercial Ins. Co. of Newark, 206 F. Supp. 11 (E.D. Wis.
1962), B. R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 137, 225 N.E.2d 195 (1967),
and McCourt v. Algiers, 44 Wis.2d 607, 91 N.W.2d 194 (1956).
109. Interboro Mut. Indem. Ins. Co. v. United States, 431 F. Supp. 1243 E.D.N.Y.
1977).
110. Id. at 1247.
111. Id. at 1247. The policy in Divine was that different circuits should not be
bound by one circuit's interpretation of the tax code. As pointed out, this
policy limitation should not apply when the subsequent case involves the
same transaction and the same issue that was litigated in the prior suit.
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Co." Butler involved a three-way truck collision. A jury
had found the defendant guilty of negligence in a prior
action, which had been filed by the estate of one of the
drivers. In that action the defendant had been precluded
from testifying because of the invocation of the Illinois Dead
Man Act. The plaintiff in the present action moved for
a summary judgment on the question of the defendant's
negligence, and asserted the defendant should be collaterally
estopped."3 The court held that the mutuality requirement
was inapplicable, and proceeded to apply the full and fair
opportunity test."' The court recommended a case-by-case
analysis as the need is not for symmetry in the law, but for
substantial justice, which depends on the realities surrounding the parties."' The court in Butler found unique circumstances and did not allow collateral estoppel."' The
defendant was not permitted to fully litigate the issue of his
negligence in the prior action because of the Dead Man Act.
If the plaintiff in the present action had been present in
the prior action the defendant could have testified against
him. The court decided it would be unfair, and would subvert the policy of the Dead Man Act to allow the second
plaintiff the benefit from the statute through collateral
estoppel. The court concluded:"'
In so holding, we do not forget the importance of
preventing repetitive litigation. The doctrine of
collateral estoppel should not, however, be used
as a club to attain that goal but as a fine instrument that protects 'the litigant's right to a hearing as well as his adversary and the courts from
repetitive litigation'.
CONCLUSION

A litigant has a constitutional right to be heard, but
in light of the judicial system's limited resources, litigants
should be limited to only one adequate opportunity to be
heard. Initially, the mutuality requirement was devised as
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Butler v. Stover Brothers Trucking Co., supra note 35.
Id. at 548.
Id. at 551.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 551-552.
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an absolute limit on collateral estoppel to ensure that the
right to be heard was fulfilled in every case. But it is now
generally accepted that :118
The fate of the mutuality rule as applied to collateral estoppel is the same as its fate in other fields of
law: as a principle of justice it has been shown to be
a tinkling cymbal, an empty and fatuous formula
productive of more harm than good. But in operation it encompassed some sound results.
Sound results are now achieved with the full and fair opportunity test. When collateral estoppel is asserted offensively the court should carefully examine the circumstances surrounding the previous case in order to balance
the defendant's right to a full and fair opportunity to litigate
the issue with the right of the courts to be free from repetitive litigation.
As the courts have been faced with more offensive
estoppel questions, certain factors have emerged in recurring fashion, and these factors have become elements of
the full and fair opportunity test. These factors are loosely
grouped into four categories:
1. Proceduralaspects of the prior action. In applying
the full and fair opportunity test a court should look at
whether the defendant chose the forum or had the initiative
in the prior action; whether the defendant had an opportunity to appeal the prior decision; whether the plaintiff could
have joined in the earlier action; whether the defendant had
an incentive to litigate vigorously because he was aware
of the pendency of the second suit, or because of the seriousness of the allegations in the first suit; whether the amount
of litigation was extensive in the prior suit; and whether
the second action affords the defendant certain advantages
which were unavailable in the prior action, such as new
evidence or differences in the applicable law.
2. Goals of collateral estoppel. The courts should determine whether the goals, of preventing needless litigation
118. Currie, 9 STAN. L. REV., supra note 5, at 322.
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or minimizing inconsistent results will be fostered by an application of offensive estoppel.
3. Dangersof offensive estoppel. Two dangers are relevant in the offensive situation. One is the problem of
claimants waiting in the wings because they have nothing
to lose and everything to gain by staying out of the first
action filed. The other is the practice of plaintiffs of using
a test case to quickly establish the defendant's liability.
Courts will be less likely to estop a defendant if to do so
would result in increased litigation or would place the defendant in the unfair position of having to vigorously litigate
a case for an insignificant amount.
4. Policy considerations. Certain classes of issues
should be litigable more than once because of an overriding
public concern. This is the only area where strict mutuality
can be justified, and the exception is limited to two situations. One is that issues of law should be relitigated so long
as the subsequent action involves a different factual situation than was involved in the prior action. Typically, an
issue of law which has a far-reaching impact on others will
be involved, and the government will be the defendant. The
other exception is that a governmental regulatory agency
should not be precluded from relitigating a legal issue going
to the heart of its power. Other classes of issues, such as
are involved in patent litigation, should be litigable only once
because of policy reasons.
Under the objective standard of mutuality, collateral
estoppel could never be asserted in a situation where it
would be unfair to the defendant. The cost was that offensive estoppel was denied in many instances where it
would have produced good results. Under the subjective
full and fair opportunity test, estoppel still will not be allowed in a case where it would be unfair to the defendant,
but will be available in the other cases to produce beneficial
results."'
MICHAEL

A. DEAHL

119. Offensive estoppel has been allowed in the following cases: Speaker Sortation Systems v. United States Postal Service, 568 F.2d 46 (7th Cir. 1978),
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(equitable lien) ; Garcy Corp. v. Home Insurance Co., 496 F.2d 479 (7th Cir.
1974), Serguros Tepeyac, S.A., Compania Mexicana v. Jernigan, 410 F.2d
718 (5th Cir. 1969) cert. den. 396 U.S. 905 (1969), New Rork News, Inc. v.
New York Typographical Union No. 6, 374 F. Supp. 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1974),
(contract) ; Scooper Dooper, Inc. v. Kraftco Corp., 494 F.2d 840 (3rd Cir.
1974), (anti-trust); and Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Jeppeson & Co.,
440 F. Supp. 394 (D.Nev. 1977).
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